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Abstract
Negative biases in the interpretation of social information are associated with anxious symptoms
in adolescents. Previous studies have attempted to modify interpretive biases to alleviate anxious
mood responses but the longevity of such training effects has not been established. A Cognitive
Bias Modification of Interpretations (CBM-I) paradigm was administered to sixty-nine 15–17 year-
olds. Participants were either trained to interpret ambiguous social situations positively, or received
control training that contained no emotional content. Participants showed significantly weaker
endorsement of negative interpretations of novel ambiguous information following positive training
than following control. Positive CBM-I training effects on interpretation did not differ between
a group tested immediately following training and one tested 24 hours later. Results provided no
evidence of differential changes in state anxiety as a direct result of CBM-I training. The persistence
of training effects of suppressing negative biases for ambiguous social information is encouraging for
future work that might use bias-training methods in adolescents as buffers against negative emotional
responses.
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Anxiety problems are common in youth (Costello, Egger, & Angold, 2005; Rapee, Schniering, &
Hudson, 2009), causing impairment at significant lifetime cost (American Psychiatric Association,
2000; Meltzer, Gatward, Goodman, & Ford, 2000). Many incidences of adult anxiety show first
onset between 11 and 15 years (Gregory et al., 2007; Kim-Cohen et al., 2003; Rohde, Lewinsohn,
& Seeley, 1991), highlighting late childhood and adolescence as a sensitive period for the emergence
of persistent anxiety. There have been many neurobiological and psychosocial explanations why
the transition to adolescence may be associated with anxiety onset (Haller, Cohen Kadosh, & Lau,
2013). However, we have also recently argued that on the basis of typical neurodevelopmental and
experiential changes in this period—notably the process of experience-dependent pruning and associ-
ated plasticity—there may also be increased responsiveness to beneficial interventions in adolescence
(Cohen Kadosh, Linden, & Lau, 2013; Lau, 2013). A next obvious question is what interventions
may be most appropriate for targeting anxiety in this age range.
Cognitive Bias Modification of Interpretations (CBM-I) training has emerged as a possible inter-
ventive tool. It draws on basic cognitive science findings of links between interpretive biases—the
tendency to draw negative interpretations from ambiguous information—and symptoms of anxiety
in adults (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002), but also in children and adolescents (Field & Lester, 2010;
Hadwin & Field, 2010; Hadwin, Frost, French, & Richards, 1997; Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2008;
Warren, Emde, & Sroufe, 2000). Beyond such concurrent associations, data suggest that negative
interpretations may precede onset of anxiety symptoms, for example in offspring of anxious parents
(Creswell, OConnor, & Brewin, 2006; Creswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005). If interpretive biases
can be modified through training interventions, it could be possible to counteract their negative
effects. Various training paradigms that modify interpretational styles have therefore been devel-
oped (Suway & Fox, 2012). In most of these, participants are provided with emotionally ambiguous
scenarios, and encouraged (with feedback) to resolve these scenarios positively across training trials.
While most CBM-I studies have been conducted in adults across healthy, analogue and clinical
samples, various studies have also extended these paradigms to children and adolescents, generally
demonstrating the malleability of interpretive biases at these ages. In particular, CBM-I training
has been shown to give rise to benign or actively positive post-training interpretations of novel
ambiguous information, compared to comparison conditions that are developed to either not change
interpretations (test-retest control groups, neutral training groups) or foster negative interpretations
(negative CBM-I training). Such findings have been demonstrated in child (Muris, Huijding, Mayer,
Remmerswaal, & Vreden, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prantzalou, 2009) and adolescent samples
(Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, & Lau, 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011), targeting social fears (Lau,
Molyneaux, Telman, & Belli, 2011), animal fears (Lester, Field, & Muris, 2011a, 2011b) and more
general fears (Muris et al., 2009). CBM-I has been also been shown to alter interpretational styles
in adolescent patient samples (Fu, Du, Au, & Lau, 2013).
Effects of training on reducing anxious mood have been less consistent, but nonetheless present
in some studies. Such effects have been seen in both adult (Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison,
& Holmes, 2012) and child/adolescent samples (Lau et al., 2011; Lau, Pettit, & Creswell, 2013;
Lothmann et al., 2011; Vassilopoulos et al., 2009; Vassilopoulos, Blackwell, Moberly, & Karahaliou,
2012). Other work has shown CBM-I training to buffer against anxious responses to stressors (Lau,
Belli, & Chopra, 2013) in typically-developing adolescents.
While many prior studies have shown that adaptive interpretive styles can be generated through
training in children and adolescents with some effects of symptom reduction, a major outstanding
question is whether these beneficial effects on interpretations persist over time. This is critical if
CBM-I is to be considered a potential intervention for young people with anxiety problems, as the
postulated mechanism for action of the training process involves individuals taking newly-modified
interpretation biases and applying them to their subsequent day-to-day lives (Hoppitt, Mathews,
Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010; MacLeod & Holmes, 2012). A preliminary test of the perseverance
of positive training effects would be to investigate whether these last for 24 hours, for which there
is some evidence in adults. Yiend, Mackintosh and Mathews (2005) showed that 24 hours after
positive CBM-I training participants endorsed more positive than negative interpretations of novel
ambiguous material, whereas the comparison training condition (participants undergoing negative
training) showed the inverse effect. These findings were subsequently replicated by Mackintosh,
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Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway and Cook (2006) in another sample of healthy volunteers. Indications of
similar longevity of training effects has also previously been shown in late childhood (Vassilopoulos
et al., 2009, 2012) but not yet in adolescents.
The present study aims to examine whether the effects of a single session of CBM-I training
persist over a 24 hour period in an adolescent sample relative to a neutral (control) training con-
dition. These results have previously been demonstrated in adults (Mackintosh et al., 2006; Yiend
et al., 2005), but given the large developmental differences between adolescents and adults in social
and interpersonal cognition (Blakemore, 2008; Steinberg & Monahan, 2007) and apprehension and
retention of various forms of information (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006), it is not certain that the
same results would be found during adolescence. Nevertheless, it is hypothesised that relative to
neutral control training, CBM-I training will suppress negative endorsements of ambiguous novel
information, and may also potentiate endorsement of positive interpretations. Further it is hypoth-
esised that these post-training effects will persist over a 24-hour period following CBM-I training, as
shown by Yiend et al. (2005) and Mackintosh et al. (2006) in adults. Using a single training session
allows for an examination of the discrete effects of CBM-I training itself upon interpretation, while
limiting potential interference from intervening experiences of daily or life events (see: Hoppitt et al.,
2010). Mood effects are expected to be congruent with training valence—i.e. positive training will
decrease state anxiety, while no changes are expected following neutral control training. Previous
research has shown the clearest effects of CBM-I on state mood to be seen on anxiety measures (e.g.
Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011; Vassilopoulos et al., 2009), but state measures of low mood
and positive affect will also be included in the current study as secondary analyses.
Methods
Participants
Sixty-nine participants were recruited from mixed and all-girls state schools in Oxfordshire and
London (x¯age = 15.68, sd = 1.53; 79.7% female). Participants were only recruited if they had no
experience of mood or anxiety disorders, as individuals diagnosed with anxiety or mood problems
may have more complex patterns of co-morbidity (Hettema, Prescott, & Kendler, 2003; Moffitt et
al., 2007; Rohde et al., 1991), and previous/current treatment, which might potentially complicate
the interpretation of results. Participants were randomised to one of three conditions for the study:
neutral control training (n = 23), positive CBM-I training tested immediately following training
(n = 24), and positive CBM-I training tested 24 hours following training (n = 22). Further details
of the study design are given below.
CBM-I Training
The computerised CBM-I training followed Lothmann et al. (2011)’s paradigm. Training con-
sisted of 5 blocks, each containing 12 training items. An example item is given in Figure 1. Each
item began with a short paragraph describing a social scenario relevant to adolescents, but missing
its final word. When participants finished reading the paragraph, they pressed the spacebar to re-
veal a word fragment that they were required to complete. Participants had to type the first of the
fragment’s missing letters to advance to the next screen, thereby ensuring that they had understood
the final word of the scenario. The completed word fragment resolved the scenario positively, neg-
atively, or neutrally. Completion of the word fragment was followed by a comprehension question
that reinforced the valence of the training item with ‘Correct!’ or ‘Wrong!’ displayed on-screen
as feedback. For neutral resolutions, comprehension questions were simply factual (see Figure 1).
The neutral control scenarios were designed and written to make sure as far as possible that any
ambiguities were eliminated from the materials produced, as well as positive or negatively-valenced
content. An example positive/negative scenario was:
“One of your teachers asks everyone to come up with ideas for the school play. When
you are asked to give your ideas, you think your classmates will find them. . . ’ ’
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[exciting/unoriginal]
The corresponding neutral scenario did not solely change the final word to e.g. “okay”. Rather
in this instance, the scenario was slightly re-written:
“One of your teachers asks everyone to come up with ideas for the school play. When
you are asked to give your ideas, you say them to the rest of your. . . ”
[classmates]
Thus, while positive and negative resolutions were aimed to create and reinforce positive and
negative interpretations of the ambiguous situations, neutral resolutions did not create valenced
interpretations. Accuracy and reaction times of responses to comprehension questions were recorded
for each item to allow for investigation of how performance varied over the course of training.
Figure 1: Example of a CBM-I trial, including (from left to right) the ambiguous scenario, word
fragment, and comprehension question. Resolutions are, from top to bottom: positive, negative,
neutral.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two training paradigms: positive CBM-I or
neutral control. For participants allocated to receive positive CBM-I, 10 items in each training
block were resolved positively, one resolved negatively, and one neutrally. This approach was taken
in preference to simply having 100% positive items in an attempt to make the nature of training less
readily apparent, thereby mitigating potential demand characteristics. The neutral control featured
10 neutral resolutions, one positive, and one negative per block.
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Measures
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (pre-training)
The trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, 1973)
was used to ensure there were no differences in anxiety symptoms between experimental groups
prior to CBM-I training. The STAIC trait scale comprises 20 self-report items pertaining to anxious
symptoms (e.g. ‘I worry too much’, ‘I am secretly afraid’) that participants rate for their frequency of
experience. Ratings (Hardly Ever, Sometimes, Often—coded 1, 2, and 3 respectively) are summed
across items to give trait anxiety scores ranging 20–60. In the current dataset the measure had
excellent internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .86).
Ambiguous Social Scenarios Interpretation Questionnaire (pre-training)
Eight items deemed suitable for use in adolescents were taken from the Ambiguous Social Sce-
narios Interpretation Questionnaire (ASSIQ; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000). This
scale was administered to ensure there were no differences in the endorsement of negative interpre-
tations of ambiguous social scenarios between experimental groups prior to CBM-I training. Each
item presented an ambiguous scenario with a choice of three potential explanations, one of which
was always a negative reflection on the participant while the other two corresponded to benign in-
terpretations. Participants were instructed to select what they felt was the most likely explanation,
e.g. ‘You go into a shop and the assistant ignores you. Why do you think this is?’ (i) They are bored
with their job, and behave rudely (benign); (ii) They are concentrating on something else (benign);
(iii) You are not important enough for them to bother with (negative). Responses to each item
were coded ‘1’ if participants endorsed the negative interpretation from the three choices, and ‘0’
otherwise. This gives a measure of social interpretive bias that ranges 0–8. The measure’s internal
reliability in the current study was however lower than would be desirable: α = .56.
Interpretation Bias Test (post-training)
The Interpretation Bias Test was taken from Eysenck et al. (1991), via Mathews and Mackintosh
(2000). Participants read 10 novel scenarios structured and presented similarly to training items.
However, in contrast to training, scenarios remained ambiguous after completing the final word and
comprehension question, and each scenario was additionally given a title, e.g. ‘Giving a Speech’.
Again the paradigm was adapted from earlier CBM-I work (Lothmann et al., 2011) to make content
more relevant to adolescence.
Following the 10 scenarios, the titles of each were presented again with four probe statements,
which participants rated for similarity to the original scenario on a scale from 1 (not similar at all) to
4 (very similar). The four probe statements always contained one valid negative interpretation of the
original scenario (Negative Target), one valid positive interpretation (Positive Target), one negative
statement that was not directly related to the original scenario (Negative Foil), and one positive
statement unrelated to the original scenario (Positive Foil). Similarity ratings of these four kinds
of statements allowed for analyses of the endorsement of positive versus negative interpretations
of novel ambiguous scenarios following training (Targets), compared to measures of tendency to
simply endorse non-specific positive and negative statements (Foils). Based on previous studies in
adolescents, target and foil probes were be analysed separately to provide insight into the direction
of any interaction effects—e.g. interactions between probe valence, probe type (targets/foils) and
training valence (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011).
Visual Analogue Scales for Mood (pre-training, post-training, pre-test)
State anxiety, positive affect and low mood ratings were assessed over the experiment (see Proce-
dure) using Visual Analogue Scales (VAS). At each presentation of the VAS, participants were given
a sheet of paper with 12 items; each featured a 10cm line labelled ‘I feel not [emotion] at all’ and
‘I feel very [emotion]’ at the left and right extremes respectively. Scores were coded 0.0–10.0, based
on where participants crossed the line for each item. Four items pertaining to anxiety (nervous,
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upset, worried, anxious), four items pertaining to positive affect (happy, calm, cheerful, energetic),
and four items corresponding to low mood (sad, miserable, upset, gloomy) were drawn from the
Positive and Negative Affect Scale for Children (Laurent et al., 1999). Means were calculated across
each of the three sets of four items to generate state anxiety, positive affect and low mood ratings at
pre-training, post-training, and pre-test for all participants. Of note, the 24-hour group completed
one additional set of ratings after the distractor task at the end of their first session; this was simply
to ensure that their mood returned to baseline before leaving and was not analysed. Given that
participants were exposed to a variety of ambiguous social information over the course of training,
we were conscious that there was a possibility that any participants at high risk for social anxiety
traits could potentially find the training stressful. Accordingly, scores before and after training were
eyeballed for any drastic changes in mood as a result of training—if any severe changes had occurred
then participants would have been offered a ‘remedial’ extra session of positive training following
the experiment, as outlined in Lothmann et al. (2011). Reliability was at least fair, and generally
very good for the three scales at each time-point: pre-training (αAnxiety = .86; αPosAffect = .65;
αLowMood = .89), post-training (αAnxiety = .84; αPosAffect = .82; αLowMood = .87), and pre-
test (αAnxiety = .81; αPosAffect = .80; αLowMood = .90)—and excellent overall (αAnxiety = .91;
αPosAffect = .92; αLowMood = .94).
Procedure
After written parental and participant consent was obtained, participants completed demographic
information and pre-training measures of trait anxiety symptoms, interpretational style, and state
anxiety. Participants were then randomly allocated to either positive CBM-I training or neutral
control. Of those participants who were allocated to receive positive CBM-I training, half completed
post-training measures immediately, and half were asked to come back after 24 hours to complete
these measures. Accordingly, twice as many participants were allocated to the positive CBM-I
training than the neutral control.
Immediately prior to training, participants engaged in a short imagery exercise to enhance the
subsequent effects of CBM-I, based on Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish and Mackintosh (2006) and
Holmes, Lang and Shah (2009). This encouraged participants to imagine scenarios happening
‘through their own eyes’, and was referred back to during the training process via the prompt
‘Imagine the events as happening to yourself’, displayed after each training block. After CBM-I
training, participants completed a second set of post-training VAS measures. A distractor task was
then administered to eliminate any potential between-group state mood effects as a result of training.
This lasted for 10 minutes, and consisted of rating 60 pictures (abstract shapes, household objects
and natural scenes) for pleasantness, each during a 10-second window. Following the distractor task
all participants again completed a third set of VAS ratings to ensure that moods had returned to
baseline.
After this point, all participants who underwent neutral training completed the Interpretation
Bias Test. However, following the third set of VAS ratings, participants who underwent positive
CBM-I training diverged into two groups. Half completed the Interpretation Bias Test immediately
after the ratings (‘Same-Session’ CBM-I group), as in the neutral group. The other half left, returning
24 hours later to complete a fourth set of state anxiety ratings followed by the Interpretation Bias
Test (‘24-Hour’ CBM-I group). After completing the Interpretation Bias Test, participants were
debriefed in full, thanked and reimbursed for their time. Participants were tested in a university
laboratory setting, and the entire course of the experiment took ∼1hr. In the case of the 24-Hour
group, the first session took roughly 45 minutes, and the Interpretation Bias Test session on the
second day lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Ethical approval for the current study was obtained via the University of Oxford Central Uni-
versity Research Ethics Committee (CUREC). Schools and headteachers were contacted, informed
of the nature of the study, and given the opportunity to ask any questions of the researchers. If
they agreed to let their students take part in the study, they sent information sheets out to par-
ents/guardians of students. Similar information sheets were sent to parents/guardians who had
previously indicated that they would be happy to be contacted about future research studies on
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Table 1: Demographic information, questionnaire measures and VAS anxiety ratings. Values in
parentheses are standard deviations
Training Valence
Overall Neutral Positive Positive (24-hr)
N 69 23 24 22
Female-identified 79.7% 100% 75.0% 63.6%
Mean Age 15.68 (1.53) 15.48 (0.51) 16.70 (0.64) 14.82 (2.20)
Ethnicity White 85.5% 95.7% 70.8% 90.9%
Asian 7.2% 4.3% 12.5% 4.5%
Black 1.4% 0% 4.2% 0%
Mixed 4.3% 0% 8.3% 4.5%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0%
Did not report 1.4% 0% 4.2% 0%
Anxiety symptoms (STAIC) 37.18 (7.15) 37.87 (6.29) 38.43 (6.39) 34.95 (8.60)
Interpretation bias (ASSIQ) 2.1 (1.67) 2.65 (1.90) 2.04 (1.30) 1.73 (1.72)
Anxiety Pre-training 1.98 (1.67) 2.04 (1.40) 2.45 (2.08) 1.42 (1.34)
VAS Post-training 1.55 (1.52) 2.00 (1.58) 1.51 (1.62) 1.13 (1.28)
Pre-Test 1.25 (1.40) 1.63 (1.57) 1.31 (1.54) 0.79 (0.89)
Positive Affect Pre-training 6.45 (1.36) 6.36 (1.19) 6.20 (1.32) 6.81 (1.56)
VAS Post-training 6.09 (1.75) 5.68 (1.49) 6.06 (1.73) 6.54 (1.98)
Pre-Test 6.15 (1.81) 5.62 (1.64) 6.18 (1.94) 6.69 (1.78)
Low Mood Pre-training 1.15 (1.20) 1.50 (1.24) 1.09 (1.31) 0.84 (0.95)
VAS Post-training 1.38 (1.44) 1.87 (1.19) 1.28 (1.53) 0.97 (1.50)
Pre-Test 1.57 (1.85) 2.07 (1.54) 1.62 (2.13) 1.00 (1.77)
behalf of their children. In all cases, the guardians/parents of participants gave fully informed con-
sent and participants provided additional assent to taking part. Prior to providing assent/consent,
participants/guardians were made aware that their data would be stored securely and anonymised
in both hard and soft copy in the University of Oxford. Participants and guardians were also made
aware at this point that their data could be used--in this anonymised format—as part of academic
work and research either within the University of Oxford or without, and/or as the basis for journal
articles and scientific presentations. Participants and guardians were made aware that they were
free to withdraw their consent or data at any point during or following the study.
Results
Pre-training measures
Gender, ethnicity and raw means for age, anxiety and interpretation bias scores are given in
Table 1. VAS anxiety ratings were found to be positively skewed and non-normally distributed by
skewness and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. These scores were transformed to better fit normality
before inclusion in parametric tests reported below; ln(x+ 1) transformations were used to account
for the fact that VAS ratings were in some cases zero. All other scores were normally distributed.
Univariate ANOVAs revealed significant group differences in age between the three training
conditions (neutral, Same-Session positive, 24-Hour positive): F (2, 65) = 11.50, p < .001, η2 = .261.
Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed that participants in the Same-Session
positive group were significantly older than in both the neutral (p = .009) and 24-Hour positive
groups (p < .001). Pearson χ2 tests found a significant difference in gender between the three training
groups: χ2(2) = 9.70, p = .008, with a higher proportions of female participants in the neutral control
group relative to the two positive training groups (which were equivalent in gender proportions).
No significant differences between groups emerged for proportions of different ethnicities. Crucially,
none of the other pre-training measures of anxiety symptom scores or interpretation bias differed
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across groups.
Training Performance
ANOVAs were conducted to examine performance during training. Separate ANOVAs were
conducted for 1) accuracy and 2) reaction times of responses to comprehension questions over
training. These contained Training Block (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) as a 5-level within-subjects factor and
Group (neutral, Same-Session positive, 24-Hour positive) as a 3-level between-subjects factor. Ac-
curacy of responses to comprehension questions did not show significant main effects of either Block
or Group, nor any interaction between them. Reaction time decreased significantly over training
(F (4, 260) = 17.17, p < .001, η2 = .203), but there was no between-groups difference, nor any Block-
by-Group interaction.
Interpretation Bias Test
A 2 × 2 × 3 ANOVA was first conducted with Probe-Type (target, foil) and Probe-Valence
(positive, negative) as 2-level within-subjects factors, and group (neutral, Same-Session positive,
24-Hour positive) as a 3-level between-subjects factor. This yielded a significant 3-way Probe-
Type-by-Probe-Valence-by-Group interaction: F (2, 66) = 4.66, p = .013, η2 = .121. To decompose
this interaction, two separate 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs were conducted, one comparing neutral control
training to the Same-Session positive CBM-I paradigm, and one comparing the Same-Session and
24-Hour positive CBM-I groups. These distinctions were made along the lines of our a priori research
questions—namely following the interactions between probe type, probe valence and training group
in Lothmann et al. (2011) and Lau et al (2011). A third 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA comparing the neutral
control group to the 24-Hour positive training group was then conducted to verify any differences
seen between neutral and positive training in the preceding analyses.
Positive CBM-I vs. Neutral Control
A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted including Probe-Type (target, foil) and Probe-Valence
(negative, positive) as 2-level within-subjects factors, and Training-Group (neutral control, Same-
Session CBM-I) as a 2-level between-subjects factor. This gave a significant 3-way Probe-Type-by-
Probe-Valence-by-Training-Group interaction: F(1, 45) = 5.12, p = .029, = .102.
Targets and Foils were analysed separately to decompose the 3-way interaction, in two further 2×2
mixed-model ANOVAs. Targets showed a significant Probe-Valence-by-Training-Group interaction:
F (1, 45) = 7.08, p = .011, η2 = .101, illustrated in Figure 2. Post-hoc t-tests showed Negative
Targets were endorsed less strongly by the Same-Session positive CBM-I group compared to the
neutral group: p < .029, d = 0.67. This difference remained significant after Tukey corrections for
multiple comparisons. No other significant between-group comparisons were found. There was a
significant main effect of Probe-Valence: F (1, 45) = 18.09, p < .001, η2 = .258, but no significant
main effect of Training-Group. Paired-sample t-tests were used to compare similarity ratings for
positive and negative targets individually within each of the two training groups. These showed
a significant difference between positive and negative targets in the Same-Session positive group:
t(23) = 4.27, p < .001, d = 1.78, such that positive targets were rated as more similar to the original
ambiguous scenario than were negative targets. There were no differences between positive and
negative target ratings in the neutral group: t(22) = 1.39, p = .179 (Figure 2). Again comparisons
remained significant after Tukey corrections.
Foils also showed a main effect of Probe-Valence: F (1, 45) = 22.77, p < .001, η2 = .327. Positive
foils (x¯ = 2.33, sd = 0.42) were endorsed more strongly than negative foils (x¯ = 1.97, sd = 0.40).
In contrast to targets, there was no significant Valence-by-Training-Group interaction, suggesting
that there were no differential endorsements of positive and negative foils as a function of CBM-I
training.
Three 2 × 2 × 2 ANCOVAs were conducted, each including one of 3 additional measures (age,
gender, trait anxiety) as a covariate, again with Probe-Type and Probe-Valence as within-subjects
factors and Training-Group as a between-subjects factor. No new main or interaction effects were
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Figure 2: Endorsement of target probes in the Interpretation Bias Test for neutral control training,
CBM-I training tested immediately after training (Same-session CBM-I), and CBM-I training tested
24 hours following training (24 Hour CBM-I). Asterisks denote significant differences at the p < .05
level.
observed in the analyses including age as a covariate. Including gender gave rise to a significant
Probe-Type-by-Gender interaction: F (1, 44) = 9.19, p = .004, η2 = .166. As above, targets were
endorsed more strongly than foils, but comparing Target-Foil difference scores showed this difference
was greater in males than females: t(45) = 3.17, p = .003, d = 0.944; x¯female = 0.18, sd = 0.28;
x¯male = 0.58, sd = 0.36. Owing to significant differences in proportions of genders across the
training groups demonstrated by the χ2 tests reported above, analyses were also replicated when
including only female participants in the sample. Running analyses while excluding male participants
did not change the significance of any findings. When including trait anxiety score as a covariate,
a significant Probe-Valence-by-Anxiety interaction emerged: F (1, 43) = 6.75, p = .013, η2 = .100.
Further examination with regression analyses showed that the higher trait anxiety score, the lower
similarity ratings were for positively valenced probes: β = −.349, p = .018. There was no significant
relationship between trait anxiety scores and negative probes.
Same Session Positive CBM-I vs. 24 Hour Follow-Up
A second 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA included Probe-Type (target, foil) and Probe-Valence (positive,
negative) as 2-level within-subjects factors, and Follow-Up (Same-Session, 24-Hour) as a 2-level
between-subjects factor. Importantly, there was no significant main effect of Follow-Up (F(1, 44)
= 0.02, p = .886), indicating similar pattern of results across the CBM-I Same-Session and 24-
Hour groups. Similarity ratings were higher for positive than negative statements (main effect of
Probe-valence: F (1, 44) = 39.42, p < .001, η2 = .472) but a significant 3-way Probe-Type-by-Probe-
Valence-by-Follow-Up interaction also emerged: F (1, 44) = 8.10, p = .007, η2 = .155.
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To decompose the 3-way interaction, two separate 2×2 ANOVAs were conducted for targets and
foils respectively. Both targets and foils showed main effects of Probe-Valence as in the 2 × 2 × 2
ANOVA, but again there were no significant main effects of Follow-Up, nor any significant Probe-
Valence-by-Follow-Up interactions. Given the lack of any 2-way interactions, post-hoc t-tests were
conducted to examine any possible differences between Follow-Up-Groups in light of the 3-way
interaction reported above. Same-Session and 24-Hour groups did not differ significantly on similarity
ratings for positive targets (t(44) = .33, p = .744) nor negative targets (t(44) = −0.45, p = .653),
nor on difference scores between positive and negative targets (i.e. Positive Target Ratings-Negative
Target Ratings): t(44) = 0.49, p = .630—see Figure 2.
As above, the 2×2×2 ANOVA was replicated in a series ANCOVAs, including age, gender, and
trait anxiety as covariates in separate analyses. No new main or interaction effects were observed
when including age as covariate. The only change to results upon including gender was the emergence
of a Probe-Type-by-Gender interaction: F (1, 43) = 6.27, p = .016, η2 = .127. Again this effect was
such that the extent to which targets were more strongly endorsed than foils was higher in males
(x¯M = 0.42, sd = 0.32) than females (x¯ = 0.19, sd = 0.26): t(44) = 2.50, p = .016, d = 0.754. Again,
all analyses were also repeated when including only female participants in the sample, but this did
not change the significance of any findings. The only change to results upon including trait anxiety
as a covariate was a novel Valence-by-Anxiety interaction: F (1, 40) = 12.94, p = .001, η2 = .168.
Regression analyses showed that, as above, weaker endorsements of positive probes were associated
with higher scores on the STAIC (β = −.452, p = .002). Higher trait anxiety scores were additionally
associated with stronger endorsement of negative probes: β = .304, p = .047.
Neutral Control vs. 24-Hour Positive Training
The previous two analyses demonstrated significant effect of training on interpretations, and an
absence of significant decreases in post-training interpretations, respectively. A third set of com-
parisons were conducted to examine if interpretations were significantly more positive 24 hours
following training, compared to the neutral control. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted in-
cluding Probe-Type (target, foil) and Probe-Valence (negative, positive) as 2-level within-subjects
factors, and Training-Group (neutral control, 24-Hour positive) as a 2-level between-subjects fac-
tor. This gave a non-significant 3-way Probe-Type-by-Probe-Valence-by-Training-Group interaction:
F (1, 43) = .23, p = .631.
Targets and Foils were again analysed separately in two further 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVAs,
following the protocol of earlier studies (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011). Targets showed
a significant Probe-Valence-by-Training-Group interaction: F (1, 43) = 4.96, p = .031, η2 = .079.
There was a significant main effect of Probe-Valence: F (1, 43) = 27.88, p < .001, η2 = .358, but
no significant main effect of Training-Group. Paired-sample t-tests were used to compare similarity
ratings for positive and negative targets individually within each of the two training groups. These
showed a significant difference between positive and negative targets in the 24-Hour positive group:
t(21) = 3.80, p = .001, d = 1.66, such that positive targets were rated as more similar to the
original ambiguous scenario than were negative targets. There were no differences between positive
and negative target ratings in the neutral group: t(22) = 1.39, p = .179, d = .290. Comparisons
remained significant after Tukey corrections.
Foils also showed a main effect of Probe-Valence: F (1, 43) = 38.07, p < .001, partialη2 = .470.
Positive foils (x¯ = 2.33, sd = 0.42) were endorsed more strongly than negative foils (x¯ = 1.97, sd =
0.40). There was a significant Valence-by-Training-Group interaction: F (1, 43) = 7.59, p = .009, η2 =
.086, suggesting differential endorsements of positive and negative foils as a function of CBM-I train-
ing. Positive foils were more strongly endorsed than negative foils in both training condition, but
positive foils were more strongly endorsed in the positive training group compared to the neutral
control, and vice versa for negative foils. However the η2 score for this interaction shows that this
was a small effect.
ANCOVAs were again run including age, gender and STAIC score in three separate analyses. No
new main or interaction effects were observed when including age or gender in the analyses. As in
previous analyses, a 2-way valence-by-STAIC interaction emerged F (1, 40) = 10.74, p = .002, η2 =
10
.144.
VAS Ratings
To investigate the effects of training condition on changes in state anxiety ratings from before to
after training, a 2 × 3 ANOVA was conducted with Time (pre-training, post-training) as a 2-level
within-subjects factor, and Group (neutral control, Same-Session positive, 24-Hour positive) as a 3-
level between-subjects factor. A main effect of time was found (F (1, 65) = 7.78, p = .007, η2 = .101)
such that state anxiety ratings decreased from pre-training (x¯ = 1.98, sd = 1.67) to post-training
(x¯ = 1.55, sd = 1.52), though this effect was small. There was no main effect of Group, nor
any significant Time-by-Group interactions. Post-hoc comparisons showed no significant differences
between VAS1 or VAS2 scores between any two groups in the analyses.
A univariate ANOVA with Group (neutral control, Same-Session Positive, 24-Hour Positive) as
a 3-level factor was used to check for between-groups differences in anxiety at pre-test. This was
done to ensure that any between-groups differences observed on the Interpretation Bias Test were not
ascribable to confounding mood-congruence effects rather than the result of modified interpretations
following training. No significant differences were found between groups, and post-hoc comparisons
showed no differences between any 2 groups in the analyses.
The ANOVAs were re-run including STAIC scores, gender and age in separate covariate analyses.
The inclusion of these factors did not affect the significance of any results, nor did it give rise to any
significant novel interaction effects. ANOVAs were repeated for positive affect and low mood VAS
scores. Neither of these sets of analyses showed any significant between-groups differences, nor any
differential change as a result of training valence.
Discussion
The current study aimed to examine whether the effects of positive CBM-I training on the
interpretation of novel ambiguous scenarios persisted for 24 hours in an adolescent sample. Results
replicated previous findings that CBM-I training is acquired effectively in adolescents (Lau et al.,
2011; Lothmann et al., 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011). Results from the Interpretation Bias Test
suggest that biases congruent with positive training material were applied to novel ambiguous social
scenarios, relative to neutral control training. Post-hoc comparisons replicated previous adolescent
findings that negative targets were endorsed less strongly as interpretations of novel ambiguous
situations following positive training (Fu et al., 2012; Lau et al., 2011; Lester et al., 2011a, 2011b;
Lothmann et al., 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011). This contributes to a body of work suggesting
that positive CBM-I training may be effective in suppressing maladaptive negative patterns of social
cognitive bias. Findings of no difference between an Interpretation Bias Test administered during
the same session as training, and one administered 24 hours later suggest that positive training
effects from the CBM-I paradigm in adolescents are comparable when measured either immediately
following training or a day later. This replicates previous adult findings (Mackintosh et al., 2006;
Yiend et al., 2005). Persistence over 24 hours marks a useful milestone for a paradigm that would
be intended in its final form to contribute to long-lasting changes in cognition and behaviour—
buffering against risk factors for anxiety over development (Hoppitt et al., 2010; MacLeod & Holmes,
2012)—and supports other such encouraging early research into the persistence of CBM-I training
effects in youth (Vassilopoulos et al., 2009, 2012). The results for target probes (which are most
indicative of interpretive biases: Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) did not differ between the two sets
of comparisons—that is, between the “Neutral vs. Same-Session Positive” and the “Neutral vs.
24-Hour Positive” analyses. This finding supports the assertion that training effects for interpretive
biases as a result of CBM-I persist over a 24 hour period in adolescents.
Self-reported anxiety ratings decreased across the whole sample over the course of CBM-I train-
ing. However, no differential effects on training were seen on state measures of state anxiety, positive
affect or low mood. These findings replicate previous studies to have shown no evidence of mood
change as a direct effect of training in adolescents (Fu et al., 2012; Lester et al., 2011b; Salemink &
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Wiers, 2011; Vassilopoulos, Moberly, & Zisimatou, 2013). In doing so they also contrast with adoles-
cent findings of immediate mood changes seen in various studies (Lester et al., 2011a; Lothmann et
al., 2011; Vassilopoulos et al., 2009, 2012). Other adolescent work has suggested that such mood ef-
fects might only be observed in individuals with pre-existing high anxiety or low self-efficacy (Lau et
al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011), or after multiple instances of training (Vassilopoulos et al., 2009,
2012). Placed in a wider context with adult findings, it is possible that post-training differences
in anxiety would only be constructed through interactions with stressors and other features of the
environment (Hoppitt et al., 2010; Mathews, 2012). Previous work has shown that changes in state
anxiety as a result of CBM-I training are most readily observable in terms of differential responses to
experimental or environmental stressors, rather than simply testing mood directly following training
(Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). More recent work has suggested that this is equally true of adolescent as
of adult samples (Lau, Belli, et al., 2013). Examining post-training anxiety effects with regards to
reactivity to environmental stressors or other processes (e.g. appraisal of intervening life events, as
in Telman, Holmes, & Lau, 2013) would be an interesting development if differential post-training
anxiety changes could be demonstrated under such circumstances.
Current findings also bear upon the methodology of future research. Typically past CBM-I
research, including adolescent work, has compared positive to negatively valenced CBM-I training
in typically-developing samples, so as to maximise the observed effects (Lothmann et al., 2011;
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). However the current data show that differences are detectable
between positive CBM-I and neutral control training. While this finding might have limited bearing
upon future experimental studies, future work that aims to clarify any clinical utility of CBM-I
training requires the development of suitable control conditions. Such work should avoid using
negative bias training in clinical or symptomatic samples for ethical reasons; such individuals may
selectively fixate upon negative information within the paradigm (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams,
2004). To prevent against unduly exposing clinical or at-risk populations to material that may
compound their negative interpretative biases, it seems desirable to develop a viable control for
positive CBM-I that is not predominantly comprised of negative training material. Based on the
results from the present study, the neutral training group could be an acceptable control.
The ANCOVAs that included trait anxiety as a covariate showed that higher trait anxiety was
associated with weaker endorsement of positive probes, but that this association did not interact
with training. This association replicates findings from previous work of links between interpretation
biases and trait emotional symptoms (Amir et al., 1998; Hadwin et al., 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh,
2000; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, & Hameetman, 2008; Salemink & Wiers, 2011). These findings
show continuity with negative and non-positive interpretive biases seen in clinical adult populations
(Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Eysenck et al., 1991; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989). That is to
say that similar associations between the valence of interpretations and trait anxiety scores are seen
regardless of whether an individual has clinically significant internalising or emotional disorders.
The current study also provides further evidence that strength of interpretive bias is associated with
strength of symptoms in adolescence as well as in adulthood (Hadwin & Field, 2010). These data
suggest that to the extent that CBM-I is effective, it is no less (or more) effective in symptomatic
individuals.
It is worth mentioning that although the pattern of results was very similar for the comparisons of
the neutral control group to each of the same-session and 24-Hour positive training groups, there were
minor differences. Namely, the latter comparison showed a significant Probe-Valence-by-Training-
Group interaction for foils. This was in the expected direction (i.e. positively trained individuals
endorsed negative targets less strongly than did the control training group), but this interaction
was not significant in the comparison of neutral control training to the positive same-session group.
The significant interaction for foils also explains the fact that the 3-way Probe-Valence-by-Probe-
Type-by-Training-Group was non-significant in the latter set of analyses. In the neutral-control
vs. positive same-session comparisons this 3-way interaction was, by contrast, significant—the key
difference being that the Probe-Valence-by-Training-Group interaction was not significant in the
neutral vs. positive same session comparisons. It is also worth noting that there were two stages
of removal between the neutral control and 24-hour positive groups, i.e. the two groups underwent
different training valences, and received post-training interpretation tests in different circumstances.
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Thus, the first two sets of analesys (positive vs. negative in same session; same session vs. 24
hour following positive training) were more theoretically watertight. That is, each only changed one
variable between comparison groups, allowing for keener inferences to be made.
Limitations
Though not necessarily a limitation, the 3-arm trial used in the current study was one alterna-
tive among a variety of approaches that could have been taken. For example an additional 24-hour
neutral control group would allow for symmetrical comparisons of variations in interpretive bias over
a 24-hour period in the absence of positive training, which is not possible with the current design.
Such a comparison would be of theoretical merit as it would control for any external influences on
interpretive bias—for instance intervening daily experiences, or natural variations in mood or cog-
nitive ability. Indeed, interaction with daily life events has been identified as a crucial consideration
for the proposed mechanism of action for any application of CBM-I training (Hoppitt et al., 2010).
Including a 24-hour control group would rule out such potential confounding effects. An alternative
would have been to use a repeated measures design, in order to track variation in interpretive biases
over time. However, in order to perform such an experiment in future there would be a need to de-
velop a new index of interpretive bias, as the Interpretive Bias Test becomes extremely transparent
in aim if administered more than once.
The pre-training measure of interpretation used in the current study showed relatively poor inter-
nal reliability (α = .56). This does not bear too heavily on the current results, as the interpretation
questionnaire was only used to test for pre-training between-groups differences, finding null results
on either this measure or anxiety scores (which are highly correlated with negative interpretive bi-
ases). However, a low reliability score suggests that the items on the questionnaire do not provide
a coherent index of ‘interpretation bias’. Since, for example, certain items may be more or less in-
dicative of interpretation bias in an unreliable questionnaire, scores from such a measure may mask
actual levels of interpretation bias. In such a case, the questionnaire would be inappropriate for
testing differences in interpretation bias between groups. Additionally the low reliability would be
an issue for future work that would seek to measure interpretation biases, and especially any studies
attempting to measure changes in such a measure. Given that administering the Interpretation
Bias Test both before and after training might confound results by making the purpose of the test
transparent, more efforts are needed in future to develop accurate and reliable alternative measures
of interpretation bias. Previous studies have in fact shown discrepancies between the Interpretation
Bias Test and other indices of interpretation bias currently in use (Fu et al., 2012; Salemink, van den
Hout, & Kindt, 2009). A specific challenge for future research is therefore to develop a measure of
interpretive bias that shows good construct validity in predicting/correlating with the Interpretation
Bias Test, without comprising the element of surprise that is necessary for the test’s validity.
The study is limited in its generalisation beyond the non-clinical sample of the current experi-
ment. Anxious symptom scores in the current sample were similar to normative adolescents’ scores
on these measures (Spielberger, 1973), as would be expected from a sample drawn from a typically-
developing population. As such the present study is limited in its generalisability to clinical or
sub-clinical high-symptomatic groups, and so findings remain limited in their applicability to mean-
ingful implementation of CBM-I protocols as potential interventions against the development of
emotional disorders in adolescence.
The current sample was disproportionately female-heavy, and both age and gender make-up
differed between groups. Though neither of these aspects of the sample is desirable, they were
unfortunately the result of random (rather than quota/stratified) sampling measures used for group
assignment. It is encouraging that no differences to the ANOVAs reported in the section above were
found upon including either gender or age as covariates in the analysis, nor when solely analysing
female participants. Future research should seek to negate the need for such post-hoc checks and
analyses by controlling for these factors at the outset of the experiment.
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Conclusion
In summary, the current study showed that the effects of positive CBM-I training upon inter-
pretation (compared to control) persist over a 24 hour period. The current study did not find any
commensurate changes in anxiety as a result of these interpretation effects, but findings identify a
path for future bias training research examining the role of stress reactivity in such scenarios.
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